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Abstract
According to a staple in the social sciences, pandemics particularly spread among people of lower social status. Challenging this
staple, we hypothesize that it holds true in later phases of pandemics only. In the initial phases, by contrast, people of higher social
status should be at the center of the spread. We tested our phase-sensitive hypothesis in two studies. In Study 1, we analyzed
region-level COVID-19 infection data from 3,132 U.S. regions, 299 English regions, and 400 German regions. In Study 2, we
analyzed historical data from 1,159,920 U.S. residents who witnessed the 1918/1919 Spanish Flu pandemic. For both pandemics,
we found that the virus initially spread more rapidly among people of higher social status. In later phases, that effect reversed;
people of lower social status were most exposed. Our results provide novel insights into the center of the spread during the
critical initial phases of pandemics.
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The COVID-19 pandemic is among the greatest global chal-
lenges of our times. Limited health resources render it impera-
tive to understand how the pandemic spreads and to identify
groups at highest risk of infection (Betsch et al., 2020;
Remuzzi & Remuzzi, 2020). The social sciences, psychology
included, consider social status most relevant in this regard.
More precisely, a classic tenet states that people of lower social
status are more exposed to pandemics than people of higher
social status (O’Sullivan & Bourgoin, 2010; von Braun et al.,
2020). People of lower social status are presumably exposed
more because they have less opportunity to follow spread-
prevention norms than people of higher social status do (Lee
et al., 2021; Oishi et al., 2021; Weill et al., 2020). For instance,
people of lower social status typically have jobs that make
physical distancing quite difficult (Jay et al., 2020), they often
lack financial resources to implement all safety precautions
(O’Sullivan & Bourgoin, 2010), suffer from crowded living
conditions (Yi et al., 2021), and tend to possess lower health
literacy (O’Sullivan & Bourgoin, 2010). For all those reasons,
the idea that people of lower social status are at the center of
pandemic spread has reached the rank of a universal rule
(Patel et al., 2020).
Here, we challenge that apparently universal rule. Specifi-
cally, we argue that the ability to follow spread-prevention
norms can cause social status differences at later phases of pan-
demics only, when spread-prevention norms are in place. At
earlier phases of (what later becomes) a pandemic, however,
spread-prevention norms are not in place and, thus, status dif-
ferences in following those norms cannot play a role. Instead,
we argue that people of higher social status should drive pan-
demic spread at earlier phases. Why so? People of higher social
status have more independent self-construals and show
more varied, exploring behavior than people of lower social
status (Kraus et al., 2012; Piff et al., 2010; Snibbe & Markus,
2005; Stephens et al., 2019). As a result, people of higher social
status—among other things—show higher spatial mobility (Xu
et al., 2018), higher relational mobility (Thomson et al., 2018),
and have more heterogenous social networks (Carey & Markus,
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2017). Stated otherwise, people of higher social status usually
meet more diverse (novel and varying) persons than people of
lower social status (Bailey et al., 2018; Carey & Markus, 2017).
Extant epidemiological and biological research shows that,
when a virus is not yet widespread, this diversity of social con-
tacts determines the probability of infection (VanderWaal &
Ezenwa, 2016; White et al., 2017). Recently, the diversity of
social contacts has also been found key for COVID-19 spread
at early phases of the pandemic. More precisely, early spread
was particularly fast in regions with higher spatial mobility
(Kraemer et al., 2020) and nations with higher relational mobi-
lity (Salvador et al., 2020). In all, due to their more diverse
social contacts, people of higher social status should have a
higher likelihood to catch a novel virus early on. By contrast,
in a pandemic’s later phases (i.e., when the virus is widespread
and spread prevention norms are in place), the classic tenet
should apply (O’Sullivan & Bourgoin, 2010; von Braun
et al., 2020). That is, people of lower social status should be
particularly exposed due to their reduced opportunities to insu-
late themselves from the virus (i.e., less possibility to practice
physical distancing and reduced health literacy; Jay et al.,
2020; Lee et al., 2021; Oishi et al., 2021; Weill et al., 2020).
Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, much
research has sought to understand the sociodemographic and
socioeconomic determinants of COVID-19 spread (Drefahl
et al., 2020; Van Dorn et al., 2020). The large majority of them
replicated the classic tenet—namely, more spread among people
of lower social status (Abedi et al., 2021; Chang et al., 2021; Chen
& Krieger, 2020; Drefahl et al., 2020; Goyal et al., 2020; Gozzi
et al., 2021; Hatef et al., 2020; Karaye & Horney, 2020;
Karmakar et al., 2021; McGough et al., 2020; Mena et al.,
2021; Rollston & Galea, 2020; Shahbazi & Khazaei, 2020; Van
Dorn et al., 2020). Of relevance for us, however, some studies also
failed to replicate this tenet. Those studies found equal spread
across societal strata (Brown & Ravallion, 2020; Ehlert, 2021;
Küçükali et al., 2021) or even more spread among people of
higher social status (Mogi et al., 2020; Plümper & Neumayer,
2020; Rodrı́guez-Pose & Burlina, 2020). Our hypothesis of a
time-variant relationship between social status and pandemic
spread promises to solve the apparent, empirical contradiction.
Taken together, evidence for our hypothesis has the poten-
tial to (a) refine the general understanding of how pandemics
spread and (b) reconcile recent findings from the COVID-19
literature that appear contradictory. To test our hypothesis,
we report two studies across three nations (United States,
England, and Germany), two pandemics (COVID-19, Spanish
Flu), and complementary levels of analyses (region-level,
person-level).1,2
Study 1: Social Status and Region-Level Virus
Spread in the COVID-19 Pandemic
Study 1 tests our hypothesis in the ongoing COVID-19 pan-
demic. Specifically, we examined pandemic spread across the
United States, England, and Germany during the first 6 months
of the COVID-19 pandemic (late February 2020 to the end of
August 2020).
Pandemic Data
We gathered information on differences in pandemic spread
and social status for 3,132 U.S. regions (counties), 299 English
regions (local authority districts), and 400 German regions
(Stadt- and Landkreise). We chose these three nations (and
only those three) a priori because they meet certain criteria:
They had temporally close pandemic onsets and, thus, each
nation had similar information available when the pandemic hit
them. These three nations were sufficiently large to show sub-
stantial regional variation in pandemic spread. In addition, all
nations provide trustworthy data on COVID-19 infections
(Public Health England, 2020; Robert-Koch Institut, 2020;
The New York Times, 2020). Also, focusing on those three
nations allowed for a conservative test of our hypothesis, as the
nations differ in their pandemic trajectories (Figure 1) and in
their scope of regional economic disparities (i.e., liberal market
economy in the United States and England with greater social
inequalities than in Germany’s coordinated market economy;
Hall, 2015). In addition, we gathered information on regional
demographic and socioeconomic differences from governmen-
tal sources. S1 and S2 provide sources, operationalizations, and
descriptive statistics for all variables used in Study 1.
Figure 1 depicts general differences in pandemic trajectories
between the United States, England, and Germany. For each
nation, we defined the pandemic onset as the day when the
daily rate of new infections exceeded one case per 100,000
people for the first time. We defined the pandemic wave in a
nation as contained when the daily rate of new infections
dropped below the threshold of one case per 100,000 people for
at least three consecutive days. In Germany, pandemic spread
started to rise at the beginning of March and, thus, slightly ear-
lier than in the United States and England. Germany was also
the first nation to successfully contain the pandemic wave (see
cumulative case rates leveling from May 4 onward). In
England, pandemic spread started in mid-March and was con-
tained by the beginning of July. In the United States, pandemic
spread also started in mid-March and was not successfully con-
tained in the following 6 months. Based on these pandemic tra-
jectories, we derived different windows of analysis for the three
nations: for Germany and England that window spanned from
the pandemic onset to its containment (58 days for Germany,
110 days for England). For the United States, there was no con-
tainment and, thus, we relied on data from the pandemic onset
to the end of our data collection (165 days).
Method
We operationalized social status as regional median income.
We determined this operationalization a priori because past
research found median income most relevant for behavioral
implications of social status (Bianchi & Vohs, 2016; Carey &
Markus, 2017). Probably for the same reason, extant research
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on social status and pandemic spread has almost exclusively
chosen the same operationalization (Chen & Krieger, 2020;
Drefahl et al., 2020; Ehlert, 2021; McGough et al., 2020).
We used growth curve modeling (Goldstein et al., 1994) to test
whether COVID-19 initially spread faster in higher income
regions (i.e., where more people of higher social status live)
than in lower income regions. In the first step, we determined
which function of time (i.e., first, second, third, or
fourth-order polynomial) can most parsimoniously model the
observed pandemic growth curve in each nation (Figure 1). For
all three nations, we found that a quadratic time function (i.e.,
second-order polynomial of time) adequately captures the
observed pandemic growth curve (see S3 for selection and eva-
luation of the polynomial function). Next, we investigated in
each nation whether growth curves differed between lower
income and higher income regions. To do so, we fitted multi-
level models (days nested in regions: United States:
516,780 days in 3,132 regions, England: 32,890 days in 299
regions, and Germany: 23,200 days in 400 regions). Our criter-
ion was the daily cumulative case rate, and our predictor was
time (i.e., number of days since the pandemic’s onset). To test
our hypothesis (i.e., whether the pandemic initially spread
more rapidly in regions of higher social status), we fitted two
cross-level interactions: Days  Median Income and Days2
 Median Income. In all models, we specified random inter-
cepts and random slopes of Days.3 Additionally, we accounted
for serial autocorrelation among residuals by specifying an
autoregressive structure of order 1 for within-region error
terms. All sample sizes greatly exceeded the recommended
minimum thresholds for multilevel modeling (Arend & Schä-
fer, 2019; Maas & Hox, 2005).
Results
Table 1 depicts the results of our growth curve models. The
main effects of Days and Days2 diverge across nations. These
diverging main effects capture the nation’s different pandemic
trajectories (Figure 1). Specifically, for the United States
(where the pandemic was not contained), the combination of
a positive effect of Days and a positive effect of Days2 indi-
cates a progressive growth curve. For England and Germany
(where the pandemic was contained), the combination of a pos-
itive effect of Days and a negative effect of Days2 indicates a
degressive growth curve. The interactions between these time
variables and median income indicate whether growth curves
vary between higher income and lower income regions.
We found significant interactions between the time vari-
ables and median income on pandemic spread. Specifically, for
all three nations, we found a positive interaction between Days
and median income. This interaction suggests that the pan-
demic initially spread more rapidly in higher income regions.
Furthermore, for all three nations, we found a significant neg-
ative interaction between Days2 and median income. That
interaction suggests that, as the pandemic progresses, the pos-
itive relationship between median income and pandemic spread
changes (i.e., decreases or reverses). To better understand the
meaning and real-world relevance of these coefficients,
Figure 2 plots the predicted growth curve emerging from the
joint effects of the parameters in Table 1. Specifically, the fig-
ure visualizes the predicted growth curves for regions of rela-
tively higher income (þ1.5 SD median income, blue lines)
and regions of relatively lower income (1.5 SD median
income, red lines).
Figure 1. Pandemic trajectories in the United States, England, and Germany between March and August 2020. The figure reveals that the
pandemic onset was slightly earlier in Germany than in the United States and England. Unlike Germany and England, the United States did not
successfully contain the pandemic.
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Corroborating our hypothesis, Figure 2 shows that the pan-
demic initially spread more rapidly in higher income regions in
all three nations. To illustrate the real-world relevance of these
effects, 30 days into the pandemic, higher income regions
(þ1.5 SD median income) in the United States and Germany
were hit multiple times (United States: 9.9 times; Germany:
2.8 times) as hard as lower income regions (1.5 SD median
income), while in England, higher income regions were hit
1.2 times as hard as lower income regions (1.5 SD median
income). By contrast, and in line with the classic tenet
(O’Sullivan & Bourgoin, 2010; von Braun et al., 2020), during
later pandemic phases, the virus spread more strongly in lower
income regions within the United States and England (red
lines). In fact, in the United States and in England, after
2–3 months into the pandemic, lower income regions showed
higher cumulative case rates than higher income regions. These
detrimental effects for lower income regions were particularly
dramatic in the United States where the pandemic could not be
contained successfully. Here, after 5 months into the pandemic,
lower income regions were hit 1.65 times as hard as higher
income regions. Notably, in Germany, the situation was some-
what different. Overall, lower income regions were not hit
harder than higher income regions. There are at least two plau-
sible explanations for this. First, compared to the United States
Figure 2. Predicted marginal means with 95% CIs of regional daily cumulative infection rates in the United States, England, and Germany as a
function of time and median income. In all nations, higher income regions (blue lines) initially show a steeper increase in COVID-19 cases than
lower income regions (red lines).
Table 1. Results of Growth Curve Models for Cumulative Case Rates Across regions in the United States, England, and Germany.
Predictors United States England Germany
Days 3.06 (1.56) 64.21*** (0.88) 58.09*** (1.34)
Days2 5.18*** (0.04) 2.42*** (0.03) 3.93*** (0.07)
Median Income 0.45 (5.44) 3.69 (1.96) 0.92 (1.31)
Days  Median Income 16.63*** (1.56) 3.61*** (0.88) 19.87*** (1.34)
Days2  Median Income 1.90*** (0.04) 0.60*** (0.03) 1.67*** (0.07)
Constant 1.40 (5.44) 0.72 (1.96) 0.33 (1.31)
Slope variance of days 5,615.71*** (148.78) 190.50*** (16.10) 635.97*** (45.93)
Intercept variance 0.00*** (0.00) 0.00 (.) 0.00 (.)
Autoregressive term (r) 3.00*** (0.01) 2.99*** (0.03) 2.71*** (0.03)
N Level 1 516,780 32,890 23,200
N Level 2 3,132 299 400
Note. Outcome is scaled, such that one unit represents one infection per 100,000 residents.
Time is scaled such that one unit represents 10 days.
Standard errors are given in parentheses.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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and England, Germany has a more egalitarian societal and
medical system (Thelen, 2012), which should generally reduce
the vulnerability of lower income people (Vadlamannati et al.,
2021). Second, compared to the United States and England,
Germany was rather successful at containing the pandemic (see
Figure 1). As such, pandemic containment likely was early
enough to prevent the pandemic from spilling over from higher
income regions to lower income regions.
We ran several additional analyses to scrutinize the robust-
ness of our results. First, we controlled for pertinent covariates
of regional median income that have been associated with pan-
demic spread: regional demographics (age, gender; Walker
et al., 2020) and political climate (share of conservative votes;
Gollwitzer et al., 2020). Next, we sought to rule out that our
findings simply represent urban–rural differences (Jay et al.,
2020) and controlled for population density (inhabitants per
km2; a commonly used catch-all variable to account for urban-
ity and infrastructural characteristics; Stuetzer et al., 2016). In
addition, we controlled for the popularity of a region as a tourist
destination (share of people employed in hoteling industry or
hotel beds per capita; Salvador et al., 2020). Furthermore, pre-
vious research shows that the pandemic initially spread more
rapidly in inequal and segregated U.S. regions (Yu et al.,
2021). Therefore, we additionally controlled for income
inequality (Gini coefficient of incomes) and racial segregation
(residential segregation white/non-White) in our U.S. models.4
We found that our main results hold when controlling for all
these covariates simultaneously (S5–S7). Second, an alterna-
tive explanation for our results might be that higher income
regions show early spread because they could build up testing
capacities more quickly. Therefore, we repeated our analysis
predicting regional daily COVID-19 death rates (i.e., a pan-
demic outcome that should be less susceptible to regional dif-
ferences in testing capacities). With one exception
(insignificant interaction between Days2 and median income
in Germany), we found that the result of this alternative out-
come replicated our previous results, which were based on
reported infections (S8–S11). Third, we replicated our main
finding using a consistent time frame for all three nations rang-
ing from March 15 to June 15, 2020. Using these consistent
time frames led to identical conclusions (S12–S15). Fourth,
we replicated our main finding using alternative polynomial
functions (i.e., third- and fourth-order polynomials of time).
Using these higher order polynomials led to identical conclu-
sions as did the quadratic polynomial function (see predicted
growth curves for third- and fourth-order polynomials in S16
and S17). Taken together, this first study provides converging
evidence from three nations that COVID-19 initially spread
more strongly in higher income regions than lower income
regions.
Finally, we sought to probe for possible boundary conditions
of our findings by exploring alternative measures of social sta-
tus (Kraus & Stephens, 2012). Specifically, we replicated our
main analyses using education (i.e., share of residents with ter-
tiary education) and occupational prestige (i.e., share of resi-
dents in managerial and professional occupations) as
alternative measures of social status (S18–S25). Given that
these alternative measures of social status are positively corre-
lated with income, they (unsurprisingly) replicated the basic
effect of the income measure (i.e., initial spread in regions with
higher educational attainment and job prestige and later spread
in regions with lower educational attainment and job prestige).
However, as these measures are less closely tied to behavioral
outcomes (Bianchi & Vohs, 2016), their effects were less pro-
nounced (i.e., smaller effect sizes) and less robust (i.e., more
vulnerable to confounds) than the effects for the income mea-
sure. These results corroborate our a priori decision to rely on
income rather than education or occupational prestige.
Study 2: Social Status and Person-Level
Virus Spread in the 1918/1919 Spanish
Flu Pandemic
Study 2 provides evidence that the conceptual conclusions
from Study 1 prevail in a different pandemic setting and when
using person-level data instead of region-level data (i.e., when
ruling out the ecological fallacy as an alternative explanation;
Piantadosi et al., 1988). More precisely, the present study used
person-level data from U.S. residents who were alive during the
1918/1919 Spanish Flu pandemic. The Spanish Flu pandemic
was arguably the last pandemic comparable to COVID-19, as
it killed over 50 million people worldwide (Hatchett et al.,
2007; to compare, the SARS pandemic in 2002–2004 killed
less than 800 people globally).
Pandemic Data
It is a challenge to gather person-level data from a pandemic
that was rampant over 100 years ago. To meet this challenge,
we used the latest techniques in social data science. Specifi-
cally, we randomly drew a sample of 5 million memorials from
the world’s largest gravesite collection findagrave.com. Mem-
orial sites from this online-gravesite collection typically con-
tain a picture of the deceased person’s gravestone along with
basic information about the deceased person (i.e., name, year
of birth, year of death, and burial site). Notably, a gravestone
picture is not a prerequisite and people can create memorials
for ancestors that no longer have (or never had) a gravestone.
The vast majority of these memorials belong to U.S. residents
and we excluded memorials of persons buried outside the
United States. Cemeteries are an integrative space (Rogers,
2004) and, indeed, we found that this raw sample represented
the actual U.S. population at the time reasonably well. For
example, among the subsequently used birth cohorts
(1880–1919), the distribution of first names in our sample
reflected official estimates virtually perfectly (N ¼ 4,085;
b ¼ .99, 95% CI [.99, .99], p < .001).
The Spanish Flu pandemic was unique in the sense that it
was particularly dangerous for younger people under 40 years
of age, whose “normal” death rate is extremely low. Therefore,
we only included people who were born since 1880 and, thus,
younger than 40 years of age during the pandemic. Given that
Berkessel et al. 5
we are focusing on a young-age group, the observed deaths dur-
ing pandemic times have almost certainly resulted from a pan-
demic infection (rather than from non-pandemic causes). In
addition, the Spanish Flu virus was unique in the sense that it
could kill at a very high speed, with people waking up feeling
sick and dying on their way to work (Taubenberger & Morens,
2006). Taken together, we assume that daily mortality data
numerically and temporally represent the infected population
reasonably well. Figure 3 shows that the period of the Spanish
Flu’s most severe wave (i.e., September 1918–January 1919;
Taubenberger & Morens, 2006) is clearly visible in our data.
Method
Following extant research (Enos, 2016; Lieberson & Bell,
1992; Piff et al., 2018; Willis & Willis, 1982), we measured
social status based on people’s names. First, we used the social
security name database to derive the commonness of a person’s
first name (U.S. Social Security Administration, 2020). It is
well-documented that parents of higher social status chose
more common first names for their offspring at that time
(Clark et al., 2015; Lieberson & Bell, 1992; Oliver et al.,
2016; Willis & Willis, 1982). For example, Clark et al.
(2015) calculated the relative representation of common first
names among Oxbridge students and found that between
1800 and 1829, common names were overrepresented among
high-status students.5 Second, we used Census information
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2010) to derive the probability that a per-
son is of Black race based on their last name. Again, it is
well-documented that people of Black race were (and still are)
among the most socially deprivileged groups in the United
States (Piff et al., 2018). We averaged first-name commonness
and the reverse-scored probability of being Black after z-stan-
dardizing the two. As such, persons with uncommon first
names and a high probability of being Black (e.g., Myrtle
Smokes or Avery Tasby) were classified as lower social status
than people with common first names and a low probability of
being Black (e.g., Amanda Cornett or Michael Walsh). Corro-
borating our measure’s validity, we found that statewide differ-
ences in name-based social status were positively associated
with statewide income levels in 1920 (N ¼ 49; b ¼ .53, 95%
CI [.28, .78], p < .001). Furthermore, for the included birth
cohorts (1880–1918), name-based social status positively
predicted an individual’s reached age (N ¼ 1,556,782;
b ¼ .01, 95% CI [.01, .01], p < .001).
We prepared our data to indicate for each pandemic day and
person whether an event (i.e., death) occurred or did not occur.
After this preparation, our final model comprised 147,954,692
daily spells from 1,159,920 persons (52.05% male) with a total
of 6,710 deaths. Thus, this study, too, was well-powered. We
analyzed the association between social status and mortality
using time-to-event analysis (Cox, 1972). Specifically, we used
Cox (1972) regressions to predict the probability of dying by a
person’s social status. Our hypothesis predicts that the associ-
ation between social status and death probability changes over
time (i.e., higher death probability at the beginning of the pan-
demic for people of higher social status). Therefore, we speci-
fied an interaction between social status and time. To this end,
we split our data at each day and allowed for a time-varying
effect of social status using restricted cubic splines
(Discacciati et al., 2015).
Results
We found a time-varying association between social status and
mortality (Wald’s test of proportional-hazards assumption:
w2(2) ¼ 15.91, p < .001; Figure 4). In line with our hypothesis,
higher social status predicted a higher risk of dying during the
initial phases of the Spanish Flu pandemic (i.e., a hazard ratio
greater than one). To illustrate, an increase of 1 standard devia-
tion in social status was associated with a 6.8% higher risk of
dying at the pandemic’s onset. By contrast, and in line with the
classic tenet (O’Sullivan & Bourgoin, 2010; von Braun et al.,
2020), higher social status predicted a lower risk of dying
during the later phases of the pandemic (i.e., a hazard ratio
smaller one). Specifically, at the end of the pandemic, an
increase of 1 standard deviation in social status was associated
with an 8.5% lower risk of dying.
To scrutinize the robustness of this result, we ran additional
models accounting for gender and cohort effects. In addition,
we ran a model including state-fixed effects to account for the
pandemic’s geographic spread. Furthermore, the 1918/1919
Spanish Flu pandemic coincided with the end of World War
I in November 1918. Therefore, we repeated our analysis
including only those deceased people for which occasionally
provided death place information on findagrave.com deter-
mined that they died in the United States (i.e., not in combat
overseas). Next, we ran a model predicting mortality solely
on the likelihood of being Black. All these additional models
led to results conceptually identical to our main-text results
(S26–S30). Finally, we wanted to ensure that our findings do
not represent a seasonal effect. Therefore, we repeated our
Figure 3. Number of deceased persons in the data for each day in
1918/1919. Beginning on September 26, 1918, the daily number of
deaths rises sharply, peaking at a seven-fold increase from baseline on
October 19, 1918. Mortality numbers remain at twice as high as
baseline until the end of January 1919.
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analysis for the same period 1 year earlier and 1 year later and
found that the pattern from the Spanish Flu period in 1918/1919
did not repeat one year earlier or later (S31–S32).
Discussion
According to a staple in the social sciences, people of lower
social status are particularly exposed to pandemics
(O’Sullivan & Bourgoin, 2010; von Braun et al., 2020).
Acknowledging that pandemics evolve in phases (World
Health Organization, 2017; Zhang et al., 2020), we provided
a more nuanced account. Specifically, we proposed that during
the critical initial phases of pandemics, people of higher (not
lower) social status are at the center of the spread. Our research
builds on established social status theory in social psychology:
People of higher social status exhibit more independent
behavior, are more mobile, and possess more diverse social
networks; people of lower social status exhibit more interde-
pendent behavior, are less mobile, and possess more homoge-
nous social networks (Carey & Markus, 2017; Kraus et al.,
2012; Thomson et al., 2018). Further, our research helps recon-
cile findings from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic that
appeared contradictory (Drefahl et al., 2020; Mogi et al.,
2020). Finally, our research makes much-needed progress
toward a distinctively psychological theory of pandemics
(Betsch, 2020; Van Bavel et al., 2020).
Across three nations, two pandemics, two levels of analysis,
and different data sources, we found full support for our
hypothesis. Study 1 used region-level infection data and
showed that in the initial phases of the COVID-19 pandemic,
the virus spread primarily in higher income regions. In the later
phases of the pandemic, however, the virus spread primarily in
lower income regions. Study 2 showed that the 1918/1919
Spanish Flu pandemic in the United States initially spread more
strongly among people of higher social status. Later on, by con-
trast, the pandemic spread most strongly among people of
lower social status. Study 2 relied on a unique historic data set
of millions of memorials, which we web-harvested using the
latest social data science techniques. As such, the study high-
lights the potential of adding a historical perspective to derive
insights into pandemic processes (Hatchett et al., 2007) and
showcases the potential of social data science to scrutinize such
historical data at large scale (Adjerid & Kelley, 2018; Kosinski
& Behrend, 2017). By combining large-scale contemporary data
and historical data, our work is one of the few psychological stud-
ies that examines historic events (Arnett, 2008; Muthukrishna
et al., 2021). A limitation of our work is its focus on three Western,
developed nations (Henrich et al., 2010a, 2010b). Accordingly, it
will be an important task for future research to probe whether our
findings extend to non-Western, less developed nations.
The COVID-19 pandemic hit the world underprepared
(Remuzzi & Remuzzi, 2020; Walker et al., 2020). Hence,
far-reaching societal decisions had (and still have) to be made
under great uncertainty. Our study aims at reducing these
uncertainties and ultimately at improving allocation of
resources. We provide a more nuanced understanding of the
initially most exposed societal strata during pandemics,
informing both, scientific theory and real-world decision mak-
ing. In fact, our findings have actable implications for contain-
ment efforts: First, people of higher social status are at the
Figure 4. Association between social status and the risk of dying during different phases of the Spanish Flu pandemic. Higher social status was
associated with a higher risk of dying during the initial phases of the pandemic (i.e., hazard ratio greater one). Around Day 55 of the pandemic,
this effect reversed. In later stages of the pandemic, higher social status was associated with a lower risk of dying (i.e., lower hazard ratio).
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center of the initial spread. As such, higher income regions
should probably be a focus of outbreak monitoring whenever
a new pandemic seems to rise. Second, the longer pandemics
last, the more they will spread among people of lower social
status. Importantly, our results suggest that previous research
might even have underestimated the risk people of lower social
status face at later pandemic phases. This is so because previ-
ous estimates did not differentiate between earlier and later
phases and, thus, lumped together their opposed effects.
As we write this article, we are amid a second COVID-19
wave. It, therefore, remains an important task for future
research to examine whether our results generalize to later
waves. Recall that our theoretical reasoning rests on the pre-
conditions that (a) the virus is not yet widespread and that
(b) social behaviors are unrestricted. These preconditions are
necessarily fulfilled during the initial phases of a pandemic’s
first wave. Regarding later pandemic waves, however, it is less
clear whether those preconditions are fulfilled. On the one
hand, in many nations, the virus was almost entirely contained,
and life has largely gone back to normal in-between COVID-19
waves (e.g., reopened restaurants, hotels, and shopping cen-
ters). From this perspective, first and later waves might show
similar spreading patterns (i.e., initial spread among higher
social status people in both waves). On the other hand, social
behaviors were never entirely reset to their prepandemic state
(e.g., mask-wearing, avoidance of large gatherings, and
restricted flying). Furthermore, the virus survived at low levels
in-between the waves in all societal strata. If anything, it prob-
ably survived better among people of lower social status. From
this perspective, first and later waves might show different
spreading patterns (i.e., initial spread among higher social sta-
tus people in the first wave, but initial spread among lower
social status people in later waves). Considering these compet-
ing perspectives, there might be no universal answer to the
question of whether first and later waves initially spread simi-
larly across societal strata. Rather, the spreading patterns of
later waves more likely depend on a nation’s specific pandemic
trajectory (e.g., consider the United States that never contained
the virus vs. Germany that almost entirely contained the virus
in-between waves).
Taken together, our findings hint at a most relevant (and tra-
gic) dynamic: While people of higher social status may import
novel viruses and cause their initial spread, people of lower
social status carry the major burden once the pandemic unfolds.
Importantly, this spread among people of lower social status
during later pandemic phases is particularly consequential.
Specifically, people of lower social status not only suffer from
reduced access to health resources (which leads to a higher
death toll) but will also need longer to economically recover
from a pandemic crisis (which perpetuates existing social
inequalities; Walker et al., 2020). Importantly, our findings
highlight that these adverse effects for people of lower social
status may be preventable. Specifically, if containment mea-
sures are implemented early and rigorously, it might be possi-
ble to stop pandemics before they reach the most vulnerable
societal strata.
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Notes
1. Ethical considerations: According to §6 of the ethical statutes of
the University of Mannheim, our studies are exempt from ethical
clearance. Our web-scraped data in Study 2 has been retrieved fol-
lowing general guidelines for ethical web-scraping (Densmore,
2017). We declare no conflicts of interest with respect to the
authorship or the publication of this article.
2. Open practices: Neither of the studies was formally preregistered.
The data sets and all analysis scripts are available on the OSF, osf.
io/k6nr8.
3. We also tested whether it was possible to specify random slopes of
Days2. We found that doing so made many models overly complex
and prevented their convergence.
4. Comparable measures on regional income inequality and regional
racial segregation were not available for England or Germany.
5. Extant empirical evidence suggests that first-name commonness
was a valid indicator of higher social status at the time of the
Spanish Flu (Clark et al., 2015; Lieberson & Bell, 1992; Willis
& Willis, 1982). However, baby naming practices across societal
strata have changed since the early 20th Century (Clark et al.,
2015; Gerhards & Hackenbroch, 2000; Lieberson, 2000). Thus,
is first-name commonness still an indicator for higher social status
in the 21st century? The available evidence is indirect and it is
mixed. On the one hand, Gebauer and colleagues (2012) found a
small, positive association between first-name commonness and
highest educational degree in a sample of 6,775 online daters from
Germany. Likewise, Oliver and colleagues (2016, p. 1) conclude
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that “higher status mothers of all races favor more popular birth
names.” On the other hand, unique (i.e., uncommon) first names
have been used as indicators of individualism (Grossmann & Var-
num, 2011; Twenge et al., 2010, 2016; Varnum & Kitayama,
2011), with individualism being higher among people of higher
social status (Grossmann & Varnum, 2011; Na et al., 2010;
Stephens et al., 2014). What is needed, then, is direct empirical
research on first-name commonness and social status in the 21st
century. Yet, whatever the results of that research, it does not affect
the conclusions from the present 1918/1919 Spanish Flu study.
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